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  This paper examines the elimination of all agricultural policy distortions in all trading coun-
tries and agricultural production decisions in the United States, as well as subsequent envi-
ronmental quality in the presence and absence of nondegradation environmental standards. 
The results suggest that trade liberalization has the potential to increase domestic production 
and boost agricultural returns by as much as 8.5 percent. Consumer surplus would likely fall, 
and the discharge of nutrients, sediment, and pesticides would likely increase. However, envi-
ronmental policies can limit these adverse environmental impacts and mute the potential de-
crease in consumer surplus, while leaving increased returns to agricultural production. 
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Legislation of the United States requiring formal 
environmental reviews, or environmental assess-
ments, of major federal activities significantly 
affecting the environment dates back thirty years. 
Within the last decade, nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and other interested parties have 
called for extending these environmental reviews 
to trade agreements (e.g., World Wildlife Federa-
tion 2001). In fact, U.S. law requires an environ-
mental review of all new trade agreements 
beginning in 2001 (U.S. Executive Order 13141, 
1999). Such an environmental review would 
likely be required for multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion in the context of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) negotiations in Doha, Qatar, in 2001. 
There the WTO affirmed its commitment to 
“correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in 
world agricultural markets.” Further, the WTO 
committed itself to “comprehensive negotiations 
aimed at…substantial improvements in market 
access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, 
all forms of export subsidies; and substantial 
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support” 
(WTO 2001). 
  While it is not clear what consequences might 
result from the environmental review of such 
trade agreements, they may include multilateral 
environmental agreements. There are approxi-
mately 200 multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) in place today, of which 20 contain trade 
provisions (United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme 2000). Trade agreements may them-
selves raise environmental quality by increasing 
income—environmental quality is income elastic. 
However, linking environmental side-agreements 
to trade agreements may be an economically effi-
cient method for avoiding adverse environmental 
impacts of trade or for minimizing the impacts of 
trade on environmental agreements. For example, 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) states in its first environmental review of 
a free trade agreement that “trade agreements can 
provide positive opportunities for enhancing en-
vironmental protection” (USTR 2003). However, 
even without MEAs linked to trade policy, envi-
ronmental reviews of policy will also consider the 
impacts of trade policy on current and future en-
vironmental policies. In the aforementioned envi-
ronmental review, the USTR states that a core 
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obligation of free trade agreements is a “commit-
ment not to weaken or reduce the protections af-
forded by environmental laws in order to attract 
trade or investment.” In light of the 2001 Doha-
WTO trade talks, we consider how adjustments to 
agricultural trade liberalization might influence or 
be influenced by national or regional environ-
mental policies such as the Clean Water Act.  
 
Background 
Economic theory typically concludes that trade 
liberalization increases overall economic welfare. 
Although free trade is optimal from the viewpoint 
of world welfare, it is not necessarily so from the 
viewpoint of a single country unless the country 
is small (Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996). For a 
large country, with appropriate taxes and subsi-
dies, a welfare level higher than that associated 
with autarky can be attained. Devising Pareto-
improving policy becomes difficult, though, in 
the presence of negative externalities associated 
with production, especially in the absence of 
well-defined property rights, which can lead to 
the underpricing of natural resources. In such 
situations, the policymaker must balance welfare 
improvements from trade against its environ-
mental consequences when setting taxes, subsi-
dies, or standards. 
  The question posed in this paper is, what are 
the agri-environmental outcomes of liberalization, 
since outcomes can be positive (decreased envi-
ronmental damage and increased producer and 
consumer surplus) or negative (increased envi-
ronmental damage and decreased surplus)? While 
a broad theoretical and empirical literature exam-
ines trade and the environment, this literature 
focuses primarily on the manufacturing sector 
(Frankel and Rose 2002, Antweiler, Copeland, 
and Taylor 2001). Fewer quantitative studies have 
examined the environmental implications of agri-
cultural trade liberalization (Abler and Shortle 
1992, Williams and Shumway 2000). These 
analyses typically assume a change in the under-
lying trade conditions as a given, and estimate 
potential production and input changes for a sub-
set(s) of the agricultural sector. As environmental 
impacts are not explicitly modeled in these stud-
ies, environmental inferences are extrapolated 
from the estimated changes in production and 
input use. 
  The literature extending trade analysis to in-
clude environmental policies is likewise brief. 
Both Anderson (1992) and López (1994) find 
that, if countries fail to institute effective envi-
ronmental policies, the environmental effects of 
freer trade can be negative. On the other hand, if 
effective environmental policies are in place, 
freer trade will generally increase total benefits to 
society (Anderson 1992). Diao and Roe (2003) 
provide intuition on how trade and environmental 
policies might interact to produce a “win-win” 
situation, illustrating how declining farm incomes 
following trade reform in Morocco could be cush-
ioned when coupled with an environmental pol-
icy—water market reform in this case. Nonethe-
less, taken as a whole, the limited number of ex-
isting studies in conjunction with their limited 
scope do not allow us to draw generalizations on 
the environmental impacts in the United States 
due to agricultural trade liberalization enacted in 
isolation or in tandem with environmental poli-
cies. Further, previous analyses do not disaggre-
gate production and environmental impacts re-
gionally—an important step, as small environ-
mental impacts in the national aggregate may be 
significant regionally. 
  A stylized, graphical representation (Figure 1) 
of trade liberalization and agricultural external-
ities for an exporting country with a comparative 
advantage in the production of a composite agri-
cultural commodity serves to illustrate our basic 
points. The initial world price and domestic pro-
duction level is {P0, Q0}, and production of the 
negative agricultural externality is E0. The initial 
emission function (G0) is determined by the inter-
action of scale, technique, and composition ef-
fects (Cole, Rayner, and Bates 1998) and can be 
assumed to be non-decreasing in commodity pro-
duction (illustrated as linear for the sake of this 
discussion). 
 Now assume that trade liberalization is 
achieved through trade policy change (e.g., tar-
iffs), which would bring the new price-quantity 
combination to {P1, Q1}. While this liberalization 
increases domestic producer surplus and reduces 
domestic consumer surplus, it also leads to an 
increase in the domestic agricultural externality to 
E1. How might potential increases in agricultural 
pollution interact with current environmental 
regulations or be viewed under a free trade 
agreement environmental review? A first-best trade  
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Figure 1. Stylized Relationship Between Trade 
Liberalization and Agricultural Externalities 
 
model would seek to maximize consumer surplus 
plus producer surplus plus environmental bene-
fits. However, to reflect better actual policy, we 
assume a second-best harmonization in which 
environmental standards are in place that restrict 
environmental impacts associated with trade lib-
eralization. This is consistent with the USTR’s 
“commitment not to weaken or reduce the protec-
tions afforded by environmental laws in order to 
attract trade or investment.” 
  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has found that agriculture in the United 
States is the leading source of pollution in 48 
percent of impaired river miles, 41 percent of 
impaired lake acres, and 18 percent of impaired 
estuarine areas surveyed (EPA 2002a). Therefore, 
it is likely that agriculture’s adjustments to agri-
cultural trade liberalization could have observable 
environmental effects in the United States. We 
examine how national and regional nondegrada-
tion standards for water quality may interact with 
agriculture’s adjustments to agricultural trade 
liberalization. The EPA adopted nondegradation 
provisions in 1975, requiring states to develop 
these policies as part of the state’s water quality 
standards (EPA 2004). These standards essen-
tially require states to protect existing uses and 
water quality conditions to support such uses and 
are among the strongest regulatory powers in the 
Clean Water Act (River Network 2004).
1
  Nondegradation provisions of the Clean Water 
Act are implemented through the National Pollut-
ant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
which controls point source discharge of pollut-
ants. The courts have ruled that nondegradation 
standards do not allow the EPA to regulate non-
point source discharge of agricultural pollutants 
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
2001). That said, of the 21,845 impaired water-
bodies detailed on the EPA 303d list, 43 percent 
are attributable solely to nonpoint sources, and an 
additional 47 percent have both nonpoint source 
and point source contributions (EPA 2002b). For 
each impaired waterbody, states must develop a 
comprehensive pollutant management plan, 
which specifies the maximum amount of a pollut-
ant that a waterbody can receive from point and 
nonpoint pollutant sources and how the necessary 
reductions will be achieved. As part of their man-
agement plans, states can and do impose nonpoint 
source controls [see, for example, nondegradation 
standards for nonpoint sources in the Lake Supe-
rior Basin (EPA 2000)]. 
  The horizontal line E2  in Figure 1 represents 
such a nondegradation restriction. Enforcing this 
restriction, while permitting the trade liberaliza-
tion treaty to move forward, increases costs to 
farmers as they change production practices to 
limit the externality. This will shift supply in-
wards to S1 and decrease production from Q1 to 
Q2. The new emissions function (G1) describes 
the new interaction between technique, scale, and 
composition effects. Returns to agricultural pro-
duction under trade liberalization with environ-
mental standards may be lower with respect to 
trade liberalization with no restrictions, but may 
still be higher than in the base case of no trade 
liberalization. Whether or not the environmental 
standards are welfare-enhancing overall depends 
on the value of (E1 – E0) compared to change in 
consumer surplus and returns to agricultural pro-
ducers. Our goal is to develop an empirical model 
 
1 Similar provisions are also found in section 4(b) of the Wilderness 
Act and section 101(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act. 
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that allows interactions between multiple com-
modities, inputs, production practices, and exter-
nalities, for a trade liberalization scenario that is 




We extend previous empirical approaches by ex-
plicitly modeling the environmental impacts of 
endogenous regional production, consumption, 
and price changes for all major U.S. agricultural 
sectors in response to an exogenous trade liberali-
zation scenario. Production adjustments are 
viewed in terms of technique, scale, and composi-
tion effects, which have specific regional, agri-
environmental implications. We extend the model 
to include nondegradation standards and assess 
the implications for consumer surplus and ex-
pected producer gains from trade liberalization. 
Figure 2. U.S. Regional Agricultural Sector 
Model (USMP) Spatial Coverage: Intersection 
of 10 USDA Farm Production Regions and 25 
USDA Land Resource Regions 
 
  The agriculture sector is assumed to be a spa-
tially competitive market equilibrium system, but 
partial in the sense that it does not compete with 
other sectors (e.g., manufacturing) for factors of 
production (e.g., land or labor). The model allows 
for production scale effects, some composition 
effects, such as a changing product mix, and 
technique effects, in response to changes in eco-
nomic incentives. For instance, nitrogen fertilizer 
use can be reduced by decreasing acreage planted 
(scale effect), by shifting to production of crops 
that use less nitrogen fertilizer (composition ef-
fect), or by reducing nitrogen fertilizer applica-
tion rates (technique effect). Estimated price and 
production changes are simulated for commodity 
production at the regional level and integrated 
into the flow of final commodity demand and 
stock markets. 
 
Simulation Model for U.S. Agriculture 
To estimate the endogenous adjustments to 
changes in underlying trade conditions, we use a 
multi-commodity, regional model [the U.S. Re-
gional Agricultural Sector Model (USMP) (House 
et al. 1999)] that incorporates agricultural com-
modity, supply, demand, and the environment to 
simulate potential adjustments in production and 
prices to policy (see, for example, Johansson and 
Kaplan 2004). The USMP uses a positive math 
programming approach (Howitt 1995) to calibrate 
production levels and enterprises to regularly 
updated production practice surveys (Padgitt et al. 
2000), the USDA multi-year baseline (USDA 
2003) and the National Resources Inventory 
(USDA 1994). Simulations are manifest across 10 
main production regions (r) and 45 sub-regions 
(u) (see Figure 2), further delineated by erosion 
class (highly erodible and non-highly erodible). 
The model includes 22 inputs and the production 
and consumption of 42 agricultural commodities 
and processed products (Table 1), which are inte-
grated into the flow of final commodity demand 
and stock markets. The USMP considers domes-
tic consumption, net trade, processing, and gov-
ernment stock demands. The model differentiates 
more than 5,000 crop production enterprises ac-
cording to cropping rotations, tillage practices, 
and fertilizer rates. More than 90 livestock and 
poultry production enterprises are delineated at 
the region level by species. 
  This is accomplished using a constrained opti-
mization approach, maximizing consumer and 
producer surplus, consistent with a free market, 
medium-run, spatial equilibrium, ℒ: 
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Table 1. Inputs and Outputs for Simulation Model 
Inputs   Outputs 
Regional National    Crops  Livestock  Processed 
cropland nitrogen  fertilizer    corn  fed beef for slaughter  soybean meal 
pastureland potassium  fertilizer   sorghum  nonfed  beef  for slaughter  soybean oil 
  potash fertilizer    barley  beef calves for slaughter  livestock feed mixes 
  lime    oats  beef feeder yearlings  dairy feed supplements 
  other variable costs    wheat  beef feeder calves  swine feed supplements 
  public grazing land    cotton  cull beef cows  fed beef 
  custom farming operations    rice  cull dairy cows  nonfed beef 
  chemicals    soybeans  cull dairy calves  veal 
 seed    silage  milk  pork 
  interest on operating capital    hay  hogs for slaughter  broilers 
  machinery and equipment repair      cull sows for slaughter  turkeys 
  veterinary and medical costs      feeder pigs  eggs 
  marketing and storage        butter 
  ownership costs        American cheese 
  labor and management costs        other cheese 
  land taxes and rent        ice cream 
  general farm overhead        nonfat dry milk 
  irrigation water application        manufacturing milk 
 energy  costs        ethanol 
 insurance        corn  syrup 
Note: The U.S. Regional Agricultural Sector Model (USMP) accounts for production of the major crop (corn, soybeans, sorghum, 
oats, barley, wheat, cotton, rice, hay, silage) and confined livestock (beef, dairy, swine, and poultry) categories, comprising ap-
proximately 75 percent of agronomic production and more than 95 percent of confined livestock production (USDA 1997). We do 
not consider potential applications of manure to rangeland, vegetable, horticulture, sugar, peanut, or silviculture operations. 
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(regional rotation balancing); and 
 
(6)    0 ≥ cr liv V F Z, Y, X , X , INP , INP , RAC, C
(nonnegativity constraints). 
 Matrix  Z represents demand for produced com-
modities (matrix P), across markets and regions. 
Matrices A and B are the intercept and slope co-
efficients for product and market demand (super-
script “d”) and supply (superscript “S”), respec-
tively.
  Matrices  Xcr and Xliv represent cropping 
and livestock activities across regions and man-
agement practices. Vectors Y  and  Wy represent 
processing activity levels and net costs of proc-
ess, respectively. Matrix INP represents variable 
(subscript “V”) and fixed (subscript “F”) inputs 
into production. WINP represents cost per unit of 
fixed inputs. The output parameters per share of 
crop, livestock, and processing activities are rep-
resented by matrices ppcr, ppliv, and ppy, respec-
tively. The input parameters per share of crop and 
livestock production activities are represented by 
matrices ppinpcr and ppinpliv, respectively. Substi-
tution among the cropping activities is repre-
sented using nested constant elasticity of trans-
formation (CET) functions [(4) and (5)]. The crop 
and rotation balancing equations ensure that sup-
ply of land (Cp,u) in sub-region (u) is allocated to 
a crop (p) and is at least as great as the demand 
for it, given by the sum of rotational acres 
(RACb,u) multiplied by the share of each crop 
grown in that rotation (s p,b,u) subject to nonlinear 
CET distribution (δb,u), shift (αp,u), and substitu-
tion (ρp,u) calibration parameters. Similarly, the 
allocation of land to various tillage practices (t) 
used in a crop rotation (b) must be no greater than 
the amount of land in that rotation, also subject to 
CET distribution (δb,t,u), shift (αb,u), and substitu-
tion (ρb,u) calibration parameters. 
  The nonlinear CET equations imply that there is 
a declining marginal rate of transformation be-
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tween land used in one crop rotation and land used 
to produce the same crop as part of another rota-
tion, and between one tillage activity in a particular 
rotation and land used in other tillage activities 
used with the same rotation. This implies that 
changes in land allocated to various production 
enterprises will not occur in a bang-bang fashion, 
but will smoothly adjust to changes in relative re-
turns across production enterprises. The transfor-
mation elasticities are specified so that model sup-
ply response at the national level is consistent with 
domestic supply response in the USDA’s Food and 
Agriculture Policy Simulator (Westcott, Young, 
and Price 2002) and with trade response in the 
USDA Economic Research Service (ERS)/Penn 
State model (Stout and Abler 2003). 
  For this analysis, we examine environmental 
parameters historically of concern for water qual-
ity and U.S. agri-environmental policy: pesticide 
use, soil erosion, and nutrient (nitrogen and phos-
phorus) losses to water. Changes in the levels of 
these parameters are estimated using the Envi-
ronmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) 
model (Mitchell et al. 1998). For each crop pro-
duction activity, the EPIC model simulates ero-
sion (sheet, rill, and wind), nutrient and pesticide 
cycling as a function of crop management (rota-
tion, tillage, and fertilizer rates) given historic 
weather, hydrology, soil temperature, and topog-
raphy data. 
Trade Liberalization 
The U.S. agricultural trade surplus is currently 
expected to be about $1 billion for 2005 (Brooks, 
Whitton, and Carter 2005). Historically, bulk 
grains have been the largest share of U.S. exports; 
however, since 2000, higher value animals and 
animal products have formed the largest share of 
U.S. exports (USDA 2004). The largest share of 
food imports is fresh fruit and vegetable products. 
Given that average global protection is higher for 
grains and animal commodities than for fruit and 
vegetables, we would expect trade liberalization 
to generally favor U.S. producers by resulting in 
increased world prices for these products 
(Burfisher et al. 2001), as depicted in a stylized 
fashion in Figure 1. We simulate changes in U.S. 
production levels and prices likely to prevail after 
all trade restrictions on agricultural products are 
lifted between WTO member nations using the 
ERS/Penn State WTO model (Table 2). This 
model is an applied partial equilibrium, multiple-
commodity, multiple-region model of agricultural 
policy and trade, which simulates the agriculture 
sector’s response to a scenario in which all coun-
tries eliminate their border protections and trade-
distorting domestic support for all commodities 
(Stout and Abler 2003). It is a gross trade model 
accounting for exports and imports of each com-
modity in every region, but it does not distinguish 
a region’s imports by their source or a region’s 
exports by their destination. 
  The core set of policies “liberalized” across all 
countries in this model include both specific and 
ad valorem import and export taxes/subsidies, 
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), and producer and con-
sumer subsidies.
2 Also tariffs, fixed payments per 
unit of output and per unit of intermediate output, 
as well as any direct and whole-farm payments 
that are based on area or that otherwise affect 
crop mix were eliminated. Decoupled subsidies, 
such as production flexibility contracts, are not 
linked to production of specific crops, and there-
fore do not factor into this set of simulation mod-
els. For example, the model removes U.S. loan 
rates for crops and marketing orders for dairy 
products. For Japan, the model removes “mark-
ups” for rice and wheat. Policy coverage for the  
 
Table 2. Changes in U.S. Production and 
Prices for Selected Commodities Following 
Trade Liberalization (%) 
 Percent  Change 
Commodities Production  Price 
rice -1.20  13.20 
wheat -0.10  4.80 
corn 2.40  16.50 
other coarse grains  1.70  13.50 
soybeans -0.70  7.50 
cotton 0.00  4.50 
beef and veal  -0.10  10.60 
pork 0.00  7.50 
poultry meat  1.60  13.00 
butter -15.00  -12.00 
cheese -0.60  -1.90 
non-fat dry milk  -15.00  -1.60 
fluid milk  1.70  -1.20 
whole dry milk  -31.60  -13.40 
other dairy  1.90  -1.10 
Source: Derived from the USDA ERS/Penn State WTO model. 
                                                                                    
2 For a discussion of agricultural trade liberalization options see 
Burfisher et al. (2001). 
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European Union (EU) is also extensive. The 
model also removes intervention prices (which 
entail government purchases and then export sub-
sidies), variable import levies, compensatory 
payments, acreage set-asides, and base-area 
bounds (which limit the total area of grains and 
oilseeds by cutting off payments if the base-area 
bound is reached). In addition, EU production 
quotas for raw milk and sugar are removed. 
  Full elimination of all trade-distorting policies 
(as defined according to the WTO) can be viewed 
as an upper bound on possible U.S. production 
changes due to a WTO/Doha trade liberalization 
agreement, as the final extent of elimination of 
trade-distorting policies under a WTO/Doha trade 
agreement is impossible to predict. Arguably, 
then, the most fruitful path for quantitative analy-
sis is to examine the scenario of full elimination 
of trade distortions, which would likely result in 
the largest production and environmental impacts. 
Policy Simulations 
In our simplified illustration (recall Figure 1), we 
depicted a price-taking country that cannot influ-
ence world prices. However, the United States is 
a major supplier of many commodities, and large 
adjustments to policy change are likely to have 
implications for world prices. We capture this in 
the import and export demand equations, which 
are shifted in the U.S. regional model to replicate 
as closely as possible the estimated ex post price 
and quantity adjustments following trade liberali-
zation (Table 2). This first simulation is termed 
scenario T, indicating the adjustments to produc-
tion and agri-environmental impacts following 
WTO trade liberalization in agriculture. Follow-
ing this simulation, nondegradation standards are 
added to the model corresponding to E2 in Figure 
1. Scenario T+N represents a trade liberalization 
scenario where the amount of nitrogen and phos-
phorus runoff, pesticide use, and sheet and rill 
erosion are held to ex ante national levels. Sce-
nario  T+R  represents a trade liberalization sce-
nario where the amounts of these same pollutants 
are held to ex ante regional levels. These corre-
spond to shifting the emission function to G1 in 
Figure 1. Note that import and export demand 
functions are adjusted in the regional agricultural 
model to replicate the price and quantity changes 
estimated by the ERS/Penn State WTO trade 
model for the initial scenario (T). The two scenar-
ios with trade and environmental policy interac-
tions utilize these adjusted demand functions and 
capture the initial trade impacts of production and 
price adjustments, but do not explicitly re-model 
global trade levels and prices using the ERS/Penn 
State WTO trade model. Therefore, to the extent 
that U.S. environmental policies will continue to 
reverberate in global commodity markets, subse-
quent world price adjustments are not fully cap-
tured in our modeling framework. 
Agri-Environmental Results and Implications 
Economic Impacts 
The results suggest that net returns to agricultural 
production closely follow the pattern illustrated in 
our simple graphical representation. Returns to 
production increase under trade liberalization, but 
consumer surplus falls, reflecting the fact that 
domestic consumers are facing higher commodity 
prices following trade liberalization, albeit by a 
smaller percentage compared to increases in net 
returns (Table 3). Regionally, the largest value 
increase in net returns occurs in the Corn Belt, 
and the largest impacts on consumers occur in the 
most populous areas, i.e., the Northeast and Pa-
cific regions. Under trade liberalization and non-
degradation standards we find that in general re-
turns to production are actually marginally higher 
(by as much as $120 million). This is primarily 
due to the increase in no-till cultivation that oc-
curs under the two environmental scenarios, 
which is likely to be more profitable in the short 
run compared to conventional tillage under envi-
ronmental constraints.
3 The decline in consumer 
surplus is also marginally higher (by $6 million) 
with environmental restrictions. 
Changes in U.S. Cultivation 
The largest adjustments to trade liberalization will 
likely occur when there are no environmental 
standards imposed (Table 4). Cropped acres 
might increase by about 1.6 million acres, most of 
which are likely to be conventionally tilled. For  
 
3 Even though conventional tillage is not necessarily the most profit-
able means to cultivate crops for all farmers, it is nevertheless an 
option used by many farmers, for many reasons (Hopkins and Johans-
son 2004). For example, our model does not incorporate possible long-
run increases in management or chemical costs associated with no-till 
management, which may explain why some producers continue to use 
conventional tillage techniques.  
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b NE LS CB NP AP SE DL SP  MTN  PC US 
  Change in net returns to agricultural production 
T  390 333  1,667 435  513  527 471  184 180  -84 4,615 
T + N   392 355  1,686 464  509  528 473  196 186  -54 4,734 
T + R    391 359  1,685 485  512  528 472  197 187  -77 4,739 
  Change in consumer surplus 
T  -2,512  -843 -1,600  -242 -1,112  -1,360  -416 -1,013  -758 -1,801  -11,657 
T + N   -2,513  -843 -1,601  -242 -1,112  -1,361  -417 -1,014  -758 -1,801  -11,661 
T + R   -2,513  -844 -1,601  -242 -1,112  -1,361  -417 -1,014  -758 -1,802  -11,663 
Note: Source for base units taken for year 2010 and discounted to 2004 dollars using a discount rate of 5.02 percent (USDA 
2003). 
a Region definitions: NE (Northeast) =  CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, and VT; LS (Lake States) =  MI, MN, and 
WI; CB (Corn Belt) =  IA, IL, IN, MO, and OH; NP (Northern Plains) =  KS, ND, NE, and SD; AP (Appalachia) =  KY, NC, TN, 
VA, and WV; SE (Southeast) =  AL, FL, GA, and SC; DL (Delta) =  AR, LA, and MS; SP (Southern Plains) =  OK and TX; MTN 
(Mountain) =  AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, and WY; PC (Pacific) =  CA, OR, and WA; US (United States). 
b Scenario definitions: T = global agricultural trade reform only; T+ N = trade reform and national non-degradation environ-
mental policy; T+ R =  trade reform and regional non-degradation environmental policies (all estimated monetary values are in 2004 
dollars). 
 
the most part, technique and composition adjust-
ments can mitigate environmental parameters at 
low cost or at a profit. For example, the increase 
in acres using no-till residue management in-
creases by a larger percentage with environmental 
restrictions than without. The amount of addi-
tional acres coming into production after trade 
liberalization also falls slightly with the imposi-
tion of national- and regional-level nondegrada-
tion policies for nutrients, pesticides, and erosion, 
which implies more intensive management of 
cropping enterprises. 
Water Quality Parameters 
Overall, in percentage terms, changes in the 
amount of nitrogen discharge, phosphorus dis-
charge, and erosion predicted by the model are 
generally less than one percent (with pesticide use 
increasing by 1.4 percent), indicating that agricul-
tural trade liberalization may likely have little 
overall impact on the environment. Nevertheless, 
changes in total acres and acreage under the vari-
ous tillage practices do help explain some of the 
environmental changes that might occur under 
various trade liberalization scenarios (Table 5). 
  If additional acres are brought into production 
following trade liberalization, the amount of ni-
trogen and phosphorus runoff, pesticide use, and 
erosion will increase if there are no environ-
mental policies to restrict their discharge. For 
example, the largest change in planted acres oc-
curs in the Northern Plains region across all sce-
narios. The changes in nutrient discharge are 
largest in this region. Nitrogen lost to water re-
sources might increase in this region by as much 
as 35 million pounds in the absence of nondegra-
dation policies. However, even if a region does 
not necessarily have a large increase in planted 
acres, it can still experience increasing runoff due 
to changes in tillage and crops. Even though 
planted acreage increases by about one percent in 
the Appalachia region, pesticide use increases by 
nearly 6 percent. 
  With environmental standards, it is possible to 
reduce the potential increases in national and re-
gional runoff at minimal cost. For example, in the 
Northern Plains, net returns may increase (over 
and above trade-only increases) by between $30 
and $55 million under nondegradation standards. 
This is accomplished by adjusting the regional 
distribution of corn, sorghum, wheat, and soy-
bean operations, and by using no-till practices. 
  Moreover, while the value of these environ-
mental changes is not known with certainty, they 
have value to society. For example, a conserva-
tive estimate of the value of reducing sheet and 
rill erosion is $2 per ton (Ribaudo et al. 1990).  
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b NE LS CB NP AP SE DL SP  MTN  PC US 
  Conventional 
T  0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7 
T+ N  0.1  -0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 0.3  -0.1 0.7 
T+ R   0.1 0.0 0.6  -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1  -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.7 
  Mold-board 
T  0.0 0.1 0.2  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
T+ N  0.0 0.1  -0.1  -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  -0.2 
T+ R  -0.1 0.1  -0.3  -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0  -0.5 
  Mulch 
T  0.0 0.1 0.2  -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
T+ N  -0.1 -0.3 -0.4  0.1 -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1 -0.1  0.0 -0.8 
T+ R  -0.1  -0.2  -0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  -0.5 
 No-till 
T  0.0  -0.1  -0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
T+ N  0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 
T+ R  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.0  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 
 Ridge-till 
T  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 
T+ N  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 
T+ R  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 
  All tillage types 
T  0.1 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.0  -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.6 
T+ N  0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7  -0.1 0.0  -0.2 0.0 0.1  -0.1 1.0 
T+ R  0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.9 
Note: Source for base units taken for year 2010 (USDA 2003). 
a Region definitions: NE (Northeast) =  CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, and VT; LS (Lake States) =  MI, MN, and 
WI; CB (Corn Belt) =  IA, IL, IN, MO, and OH; NP (Northern Plains) =  KS, ND, NE, and SD; AP (Appalachia) =  KY, NC, TN, 
VA, and WV; SE (Southeast) =  AL, FL, GA, and SC; DL (Delta) =  AR, LA, and MS; SP (Southern Plains) =  OK and TX; MTN 
(Mountain) =   AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, and WY; PC (Pacific) =  CA, OR, and WA; US (United States). 
b Scenario definitions: T = global agricultural trade reform only; T+ N = trade reform and national non-degradation environ-
mental policy; T+ R =  trade reform and regional non-degradation environmental policies. 
 
 
Therefore, the benefits of a regional nondegrada-
tion constraint on soil erosion could be as high as 
$16 million ($2 x 8 million tons of erosion), 
which exceeds the reduction in consumer surplus 
associated with trade liberalization alone versus 
trade liberalization with environmental con-
straints ($6 million). 
Conclusions 
U.S. law mandates that the federal government 
perform environmental assessments of all pro-
posed trade agreements (U.S. Executive Order 
13141, 1999). Because the federal government 
has little experience to date in estimating envi-
ronmental consequences of agricultural trade 
agreements, our approach can serve as one model 
for such studies by others. 
  We also explore how nondegradation standards 
for agricultural externalities might influence pro-
ducer adjustments to trade policy. Our results 
suggest that under a post-Doha trade liberaliza-
tion scenario, agricultural trade liberalization is 
likely to affect the environment in a variety of   
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b NE LS CB NP AP SE DL SP  MTN  PC US 
  Nitrogen losses to water (lbs.) 
T  3.7 9.8  19.2  35.2 8.2 0.6  -1.5 3.7 0.8  -0.5  79.2 
T+ N  1.3 -4.8 12.8 20.8 -7.2 -0.3  -10.4 -6.0  3.4 -5.6  4.1 
T+ R    0.0 -0.8 -0.1  1.8 -0.8  0.1 -0.4  1.0  0.6 -0.2  1.2 
  Phosphorus losses to water (lbs.) 
T  0.6 0.2 2.5 2.5 0.9 0.0  -0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 6.7 
T+ N  0.4  0.0  1.7  0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -1.2 -0.4 -0.1  0.0 -0.1 
T+ R  0.1 0.1 0.1  -1.8 0.0 0.0  -0.2 0.1  -0.1 0.0  -1.9 
  Total pesticide use (lbs. active ingredient) 
T  0.1 0.4 1.3 2.0 1.6  -0.1  -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 5.4 
T+ N  0.0 -0.3  0.3  1.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1  0.0 -0.2  0.0 
T+ R  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1 
  Sheet and rill erosion (tons) 
T  0.5 0.5 4.1 1.3 0.3 0.0  -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 6.4 
T+ N  0.4 -0.2  2.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -1.5 -0.3  0.0  0.0 -0.6 
T+ R  0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -1.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0 -2.4 
a Region definitions: NE MI,  CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, and VT; LS (Lake States) =  (Northeast) = KS,  IA, 
IL, IN, MO, and OH; NP (Northern Plains) =  MN, and WI; CB (Corn Belt) = AL,  KY, NC, TN, VA, and WV; SE (Southeast) = 
ND, NE, and SD; AP (Appalachia) = OK and TX;  AR, LA, and MS; SP (Southern Plains) =  FL, GA, and SC; DL (Delta) = CA, 
OR, and  AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, and WY; PC (Pacific) =  MTN (Mountain) = WA; US (United States). 
b Scenario definitions: T global agricultural trade reform only;  = T+ N trade reform and  = national non-degradation environ-
mental policy; T+ R =  trade reform and regional non-degradation environmental policies. 
 
 
ways, some positive and others negative. Nonde-
gradation standards at the national or regional 
level can prevent harmful environmental impacts, 
while leaving producers’ gains to trade relatively 
unaltered. 
  Our modeling framework contains many of the 
agri-environmental indicators that are tradition-
ally the focus of U.S. agricultural policy. How-
ever, the set of indicators is by no means com-
plete, nor do we have good estimates of their 
value to society. Our results indicate that the 
value of restricting the amount of sheet and rill 
erosion alone may be greater than the potential 
costs to consumers and producers when adjust-
ments to agricultural trade liberalization are con-
strained by nondegradation standards. Future re-
search extensions could incorporate environ-
mental impacts (and valuation thereof) due to 
changes in greenhouse gas emissions, manure 
nutrient and bacterial discharges, and emissions 
of pollutants associated with fuel usage, as well 
as environmental amenities associated with agri-
cultural production. 
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